基于销售商过度自信的定价与生产联合决策 - 东北电力大学 - 上海交通 .docVIP

基于销售商过度自信的定价与生产联合决策 陈克贵1 宋学锋2 王新宇1 黄 敏3 (1.中国矿业大学 管理学院，江苏 徐州 221116；2.南京财经大学 管理科学与工程学院，南京 210046 东北大学 信息科学与工程学院 流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室沈阳 110819和oint Pricing and Production Decisions with the Overconfident Sales Agent CHEN Ke-gui1, SONG Xue-feng1, WANG Xin-yu1, HUANG Min2 (1.School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, Jiangsu, China；2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210046, China; 3. College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern ?University; State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation?for Process Industries, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China) Abstract: Aiming at the supply chain with a rational manufacturer and an overconfident sales-agent, we investigate how the manufacturer makes the pricing and production decisions simultaneously and provides incentives to the sales agent so that the agent works hard to sell the product. We develop the principal-agent model and analyze the impact of the sales-agents overconfidence level on its optimal effort, the manufacturers expected profit, the pricing and production decisions and the incentive contract. We then compare the results to the rational scenario. It is found that, as the overconfidence level increases, the sales-agents effort level, the manufacturers pricing and production decisions, the corresponding expected profit deviate far away from the rational scenario. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate the validity of the proposed model and the analysis. Key words: overconfidence; incentive contract; optimal pricing and production; principal-agent theory 参考文献： 陈剑,徐鸿雁.基于销售商努力的供应商定价和生产决策[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2009, 29(5): 1-10. Xu H, Huang H, Chen J. Dynamic pricing and compensation on heterogeneous sales forces[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, 2012, 21(2): 204-225. 徐鸿雁,黄河,陈剑.针对不同类型销售商的长期激励合同设计研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(6): 118-124. Dai Y, Chao X L. Salesforce contra