代理问题公司治理与盈余稳健性-NationalUniversityofKaohsiung.DOCVIP

代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism 高蘭芬 Lanfeng Kao( 陳怡凱 Yi-Kai Chen 陳美蓮 Mei-Lian Chen 國立高雄大學National University of Kaohsiung This version: April 2009 代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism 摘要 關鍵字：穩健會計、代理問題、公司治理 Abstract This paper investigates the effectiveness of accounting conservatism in mitigating the agency problems among stakeholders. The paper also examines whether the governance role of conservatism could be substituted by other corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical results indicate that