博弈论第一讲 复旦大学 王永钦.pptVIP

Fall, 2007, Fudan University Game Theory--Lecture 1 * The problems of commons The Moral of the story Externality and Property rights Global governance Fall, 2007, Fudan University Game Theory--Lecture 1 * Correlated equilibrium (Aumann) Using correlating device can be Pareto-improving In the prisoner’s dilemma case, consider the following correlating device Sun: play mum; Rain: play confess with equal probability Then the payoff for each is 1/2x1/2x(-1)+1/2x1/2(-9)+ 1/2x1/2x0+1/2x1/2x(-6)=-4-6 Fall, 2007, Fudan University Game Theory--Lecture 1 * Correlated equilibrium The nature of correlated equilibrium A convex set of NEs Convexification Pareto-improves (see figure) Proposition: Every NE is CE Intuition: simply assigning probability 1 to the actions Examples Fed-speak Social norm as CE Superstition/ideology as CE Lecture 1 May 19, 2003 * Fall, 2007, Fudan University Game Theory--Lecture 1 * Cournot model of oligopoly A product is produced by only n firms: firm 1 to firm n. Firm i’s quantity is denoted by qi. Each firm chooses the quantity without knowing the other firms’ choices. The market priced is P(Q)=a-Q, where a is a constant number and Q=q1+q2+...+qn. The cost to firm i of producing quantity qi is Ci(qi)=cqi. Fall, 2007, Fudan University Game Theory--Lecture 1 * Cournot model of oligopoly The normal-form representation: Set of players: { Firm 1, ... Firm n} Sets of strategies: Si=[0, +∞), for i=1, 2, ..., n Payoff functions: ui(q1 ,..., qn)=qi(a-(q1+q2 +...+qn)-c)for i=1, 2, ..., n Fall, 2007, Fudan University Game Theory--Lecture 1 * Cournot model of oligopoly How to find a Nash equilibrium Find the quantities (q1*, ... qn*) such that qi* is firm i’s best response to other firms’ quantities That is, q1* solves Max u1(q1, q2*, ..., qn*)=q1(a-(q1+q2* +...+qn*)-c)subject to 0 ? q1 ? +∞and q2* solvesMax u2(q1*, q2 , q3*, ..., qn*)=q2(a-(q1*+q2+q3*+ ...+ qn*)-c)subject to 0 ? q2 ? +∞....... Fall, 2007, Fudan University Game Theory--L