政府行为,股权安排与公司治理的有效性——基于盈余质量视角的研究.docVIP

政府行为、股权安排与公司治理的有效性? ——基于盈余质量视角的研究 You Jia-xing1，Luo Sheng-qiang2 1 School of Economics, Xiamen University, P.R.China,361005 2 School of Management, Xiamen University, P.R.China, 361005 摘要(: 企业作为一系列契约的结合点，其契约设计通常以会计信息为基础，如公司经营绩效评价、经理人薪酬设计等等。公司内部人出于个人私利就有动机解除契约约束，其中最常见的方式就是运用编制财务报告的会计政策选择权隐瞒公司实际情况，从而降低了公司财务报告的透明度和可靠性。因此，公司治理制度安排有效与否的另一个重要表征表现在其财务报告质量的高低上。本文以上市公司为研究对象，探讨在政府控制的特经济环境下，股权安排对会计的影响。第二大股东股东的壕沟防御效应作用。与控股股东为非国有的上市公司，控股股东为国有的上市公司，更低随着政府股权持有比例的增加和政府干预的加大。Abstract: As a connection of a series of contracts, the design of company contracts is based on the accounting information such as the evaluation on the firm performance and the design of managers’ compensation and so on. The company insiders have the incentive to unchain the restriction of contracts, and the most common way is to manage reported earnings to hide the real management situation of the company, which will reduce the transparence and reliability of the financial report. So the level of earnings quality is the important character of the efficiency of the corporate government. Based on Chinese listed companies from 2000 to 2005, this paper examines the effect of ownership structure on the earnings quality in the special economic environment characterized by government control, and explores the efficiency of corporate governance from the perspective of accounting covenant. Presented empirical evidences indicate that the effect of controlling shareholder is nonlinear, and the second largest shareholder have motivation to curb such tunneling effects with the increase in its holding share. Further empirical evidences show that value relevance of accounting information provided by listed companies who are controlled by the state is weaker than that of those who are not. And the earnings quality provided by state-controlled listed companies will be much lower when state-controlled shares increase more and the extent to which the government exerts intervention behaviors is much stronger. Key words: Govern