credit constraints and decisions in exports theory under asymmetric information出口信贷约束和决策理论在信息不对称.pdfVIP

Journal of Mathematical Finance, 2012, 2, 238-242 /10.4236/jmf.2012.23026 Published Online August 2012 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/jmf) Credit Constraints and Decisions in Exports: Theory under Asymmetric Information Xin Zhang Key Laboratory of International Commodity Transaction Analysis and Simulation, Liaoning University of International Business and Economics, Dalian, China Email: xiongyingsharon@ Received January 19, 2012; revised February 20, 2012; accepted March 3, 2012 ABSTRACT This paper examines why credit constraints for domestic and exporting firms arise in a setting where banks do not ob- serve firms’ productivities. To maintain incentive-compatibility, banks lend below the amount needed for first-best pro- duction. The longer time needed for export shipments induces a tighter credit constraint on exporters than on purely domestic firms, even in the exporters’ home market. Greater risk faced by exporters also affects the credit extended by banks. Extra fixed costs reduce exports on the extensive margin, but can be offset by collateral held by exporting firms. Keywords: Credit Constraints; Asymmetric Information; Heterogeneous Productivity 1. Introduction lieve this assumption is realistic in rapidly growing economies such as China with rapid entry, and perhaps The financial crisis of 2008 has led researchers to ask more generally. The bank will confront firms with a whether credit constraints