game analysis of beijing#39;s high-tech smes（北京# 39;年代的博弈分析高新技术中小企业）.docVIP

Game Analysis of Beijing#39;s high-tech SMEs REVIEW Papers :: Currently, high-tech small and medium enterprises facing financing difficulties, its existence is not high credit risk awareness is weak, lack of management, financing concept behind the single way of financing and other issues, for which development has played a certain negative constraints. What problems exist in high-tech SMEs credit financing process in the end, the decision whether the various financial institutions influence each other, how the efficiency of financial institutions lending? We will use the game matrix analysis method, the same time with Stackelberg model to analyze these issues. Paper Keywords: high-tech SMEs, financing constraints, game matrix analysis, Stackelberg model Currently the presence of high-tech SMEs financing constraints: Less (a) corporate credit rating, guarantees enough, resulting in bank credit crunch currently SMEs due to their limited size, not enough talent pool and other issues, it is the concept of credit is more thin, self-discipline is weak, funds management and utilization efficiency lower, resulting in fleeing bank debt, debt is not yet the situation. We use game theory to simulate the game between enterprises and banks: M: business loans from banks amount I: loans generate interest P: business profits based on the assumption of rational people, this time, will form a short-term complete information static game matrix [1], as shown below: SME Bank Loan repayment Do not repay the loan Credit I, P - (M + I), M + I + P Not lending -I, -P -I, -P From the game matrix, we can see that if lenders and SMEs are as economics, ‘rational people.’ For SMEs, the matrix in which the optimal solution is [- (M + I), M + I + P], namely enterprises to obtain loans from banks, and not to repay the loan game matrix analysis, corporate earnings for the M + I + P, the policy does not repay the loan than repay the loan, then the c