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Ronald Dworkin的第三种理论 Ronald?Dworkin基于某些法律标准的权威性无法通过社会事实加以解释的理由而拒绝了实证主义者的事实命题主张。例如，在疑难案件中法官求诸道德原则，Dworkin坚信这些道德原则的法律权威性是无法从社会的承认规则中的合法性标准里面推导出来的?(Dworkin?1977,?p.?40)。尽管如此，因为法官受相关的原则的拘束，他们必须被定性为“法律”。因而，Dworkin归纳道，“如果我们把原则当作法律的话，我们必须拒绝实证主义者的第一个信条，即一个共同体的法律可以依靠某种根本尺度的测试而与其他社会标准分离”(Dworkin?1977,?p.?44)。Ronald?Dworkin?rejects?positivisms?Social?Fact?Thesis?on?the?ground?that?there?are?some?legal?standards?the?authority?of?which?cannot?be?explained?in?terms?of?social?facts.?In?deciding?hard?cases,?for?example,?judges?often?invoke?moral?principles?that?Dworkin?believes?do?not?derive?their?legal?authority?from?the?social?criteria?of?legality?contained?in?a?rule?of?recognition?(Dworkin?1977,?p.?40).?Nevertheless,?since?judges?are?bound?to?consider?such?principles?when?relevant,?they?must?be?characterized?as?law.?Thus,?Dworkin?concludes,?if?we?treat?principles?as?law?we?must?reject?the?positivists?first?tenet,?that?the?law?of?a?community?is?distinguished?from?other?social?standards?by?some?test?in?the?form?of?a?master?rule?(Dworkin?1977,?p.?44).?Dworkin认为判决是并且应当是解释性的：“法官通过解释共同体的政治结构来对疑难案件做出判决时，应当依照下面这种，或许不无特殊的，方式进行：基于这一解构的整体性，从最深刻的宪法规则与私法——比如侵权法或合同法的的细则中，尝试着寻找政治道德的原则之间的最佳证立”(Dworkin?1982,?p.?165)。此处存在两个解释成功的基本要素。其一，只有当一个解释证立了该社会中的某种实践，这一解释才是成功的。这一解释必须在这种意义上符合这一社会的某种实践——它与现有的定义法律实践的材料相融贯。其二，由于某一解释为那些实践提供了一种道德上的证立，它必须达到可能达到的最好的道德观点。因此，Dworkin称法官应该努力地以大致这样地方式解释法律：Dworkin?believes?adjudication?is?and?should?be?interpretive:?judges?should?decide?hard?cases?by?interpreting?the?political?structure?of?their?community?in?the?following,?perhaps?special?way:?by?trying?to?find?the?best?justification?they?can?find,?in?principles?of?political?morality,?for?the?structure?as?a?whole,?from?the?most?profound?constitutional?rules?and?arrangements?to?the?details?of,?for?example,?the?private?law?of?tort?or?contract?(Dworkin?1982,?p.?165).?There?are,?then,?two?elements?of?a?successful?interpretation.?First,?since?an?interpretation?is?successful?insofar?as?it?justifies?the?particular?practices?