(信息非对称性与市场失灵).pdf

Chapter 12 Market Failure and Public Goods ©2005 MOL Chapter 12 includes: 11.1 Market Failure 11.2 Monopoly and Nature Monopoly 11.3 Externalities 11.4 Asymmetric Information 11.5 Public Goods and Common Resources Readings about this chapter Zhang: Chapter 16,P449-479 Nicholson: Chapter 24, P659-683 Chapter 12 includes: 11.1 Market Failure 11.2 Monopoly and Nature Monopoly 11.3 Externalities 11.4 Asymmetric Information 11.5 Public Goods and Common Resources Asymmetric Information and Market Failure (信息非对称性与市场失灵) if agents do not have perfect and complete information, not all assumptions of perfectly competitive markets are fulfilled and we cannot rely on markets to produce Pareto-efficient results Imperfect Information and Adverse Selection （逆向选择） Most voluntary exchanges are efficient, but in the presence of imperfect information, not all exchanges are efficient. Adverse selection can occur when a buyer or seller enters into an exchange with another party who has more information. Imperfect Information and Moral Hazard （道德风险） Moral hazard arises when one party to a contract passes the cost of his or her behavior on to the other party to the contract. The moral hazard problem is an information problem, in which contracting parties cannot always determine the future behavior of the person with whom they are contracting. Moral Hazard in the Insurance Industry after buying insurance, the client has less of an incentive to reduce risk, because insurance covers loss. this can lead to market failure, if insurance that covers client with risky behavior is too expensive for clients who behave carefully and hence nobody will buy insurance Market Solutions to the Moral Hazard Problem: Co-Insurance （共同保险）and