基于销售商过度自信的定价与生产联合决策-系统管理学报-上海交通大学.docVIP

PAGE  基于销售商过度自信的定价与生产联合决策 陈克贵1 宋学锋2 王新宇1 黄 敏3 (1.中国矿业大学 管理学院，江苏 徐州 221116；2.南京财经大学 管理科学与工程学院，南京 210046；3. 东北大学 信息科学与工程学院 流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室，沈阳 110819 ) 【摘要】考虑由理性的制造商和过度自信的销售商所构成的供应链，研究制造商如何进行产品的生产决策及定价并设计合适的激励机制来激励销售商努力工作。针对这一问题，提出委托代理模型并从理论上分析了销售商的过度自信程度对其努力程度，制造商的最优期望利润、生产和价格决策以及最优的激励合同的影响，进而与销售商完全理性的情形进行了对比。研究发现，随着销售商过度自信程度的增加，销售商的努力程度、制造商的最优生产和价格决策以及期望利润会越来越偏离理性时的情形，最后，通过算例对结论进行了分析验证。 关键词：过度自信；激励合同；最优定价订量；委托代理理论 Joint Pricing and Production Decisions with the Overconfident Sales Agent CHEN Ke-gui1, SONG Xue-feng1, WANG Xin-yu1, HUANG Min2 (1.School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, Jiangsu, China；2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210046, China; 3. College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern ?University; State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation?for Process Industries, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China) Abstract: Aiming at the supply chain with a rational manufacturer and an overconfident sales-agent, we investigate how the manufacturer makes the pricing and production decisions simultaneously and provides incentives to the sales agent so that the agent works hard to sell the product. We develop the principal-agent model and analyze the impact of the sales-agents overconfidence level on its optimal effort, the manufacturers expected profit, the pricing and production decisions and the incentive contract. We then compare the results to the rational scenario. It is found that, as the overconfidence level increases, the sales-agents effort level, the manufacturers pricing and production decisions, the corresponding expected profit deviate far away from the rational scenario. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate the validity of the proposed model and the analysis. Key words: overconfidence; incentive contract; optimal pricing and production; principal-agent theory 参考文献： 陈剑,徐鸿雁.基于销售商努力的供应商定价和生产决策[J]. 系统工程理论与实