基于身份的签密方案的安全性分析与改进-Core.PDFVIP

2009 1 JISUANJI YU XIANDA IHUA 161 : 2009) (厦门大学计算机科学系, 福建 厦门 361005) : 目前对签密方案的安全性研究集中在满足机密性不可 造性和不可否认性的安全性要求上本文对两 个自称安 全的签密方案[ 1011] 进行了安全性分析, 指出其方案中存在的安全性漏洞, 首次提出签密中一个容易忽视的安全攻击: 信 [ 11] 用中心 PKG和接收方的合伙攻击在此基础上, 对签密方案 进行了改进, 经验证新方案满足签密的安全性要求 : 基于身份; 签密; 双线性; PKG; 合伙攻击 : TP309 : A Safety A nalysis and Im provem ent of Signcryp tion Schem e Ba sed on Iden tity HANG M ingzhi (Departm ent of Com puter Science, X iam en University, X iam en 361005, Ch ina) A b stract: At present the secure research of signcryption schem e concentrates on satisfying the confidentiality, not to be possible to fabricate and undeniable in the secure request. Th is paper carries on the safety analysis on two signcryption solutions, points out secure crackw hich in its p lan ex ists, proposes for the first tmi e the safe attack wh ich is easy to neglect: Cred it center PKG and the receiving end form a partnersh ip to attack. Based on th is, this papermakes an mi provem ent on solution, after the analysis, the new plan has a higher security. K ey w ords: identitybased; signcryption; b ilinearity; PKG; coattack 0 (3) 1984, Sham ir [ 1] , , , (Email ), , , PKG2001, Boneh Franklin W eil [ 2] , heng Y. 1997 , [ 3] 2002M a loneLee BonehFra