最优专利制度设计.docxVIP

摘 要本文首先对专利制度进行了定义，并分析了专利制度在当前经济形势中存在的意义。从国际实践和各个模型的结论来看，不可能有一种专利制度适合所有的国家和行业。通过对西方有关最优专利制度设计的模型的总结和梳理，本文进而着眼于专利高度的保护，建立了基于静态质量竞争的理论模型，作为对动态质量竞争模型的延伸和补充。模型得到了与动态质量竞争模型部分类似的结论，在中弱强度的专利高度保护中，专利高度保护会失去激励机制的必要性。而高强度的专利保护又将以更高的社会成本为代价。对于“专利陷阱”的机制，本文模型通过分析“挤出效应”得到了与之前模型不同的传导途径，进而，模型推导出了收入分配差距越大，中高强度专利保护所带来的社会福利损失越大的收入分配效应。换言之，收入分配差距越大，为了使社会福利尽可能少损失而实行的专利保护应该越弱。随后，通过2007年国际截面数据，2007年国内截面数据和1986年至2009年的国内时间序列数据对这一收入分配效应进行定量和定性的实证检验，均得到了支持。因此，本文认为收入分配效应刚性较强。但专利制度作为创新的激励机制而存在的合理性和必要性仍然在学界遭受质疑。事实上，在有些市场结构中，专利保护可能会失去应有的激励作用。虽然，有关专利制度的存废不在本文的重点讨论范围之内，但本文也对此进行了开放式的探讨。关键词：专利制度 专利高度 专利陷阱 挤出效应 收入分配效应中图分类号：G30 G2AbstractThis paper initially makes a definition toward the patent system and analyzes why it is essential in modern economy. According to the practices in worldwide and the basic implication from bunch of models, there is no one-size-fits-all patent policy in spite of countries and industries.Then, we introduce some classic theoretical models related to the optimal patent design in the western world, based on which a model focusing on patent height is developed. This model is an optimal patent height model without continuous patent race. In another word, it is in a static quality improvement setting, which could serve as a complement to the dynamic quality improvement model in Theon van Dijk’s work.Both of the models share some similar conclusions that patent height is not necessary if the protection is rather low or intermediate. However, high level of patent height will be effective at the cost of huge social welfare loss. As to the “patent trap”, we find a totally different channel to explain it by means of taking into account “the crowding out effect”. Furthermore, the model also implies that the larger the income gap is, the more will the society suffer from the intermediate and high protection of patent height, which is the so-called “income distribution effect”. One deduction is that if a country is not that equal, to minimize the social welfare loss, weak prot