Importing Corruption Culture from Overseas Evidence from Corporate Tax Evasion in the United States (2011) by Jason DeBacker, Bradley T Heim Anh Tran外语英文电子书.pdfVIP

Importing Corruption Culture from Overseas: Evidence from Corporate Tax Evasion in the United States* † ‡ § Jason DeBacker , Bradley T. Heim and Anh Tran October 18, 2011 Abstract This paper studies how cultural norms and enforcement policies influence illicit corporate activities. Using confidential IRS audit data, we show that corporations with owners from countries with higher corruption norms engage in higher amounts of tax evasion in the U.S. This effect is strong for small corporations and decreases as the size of the corporation increases. In the mid-2000s, the United States implemented several enforcement measures which significantly increased tax compliance. However, we find that these enforcement efforts were less effective in reducing tax evasion by corporations whose owners are from countries with higher corruption norms. This suggests that cultural norms can be a challenge to legal enforcement. Keywords: tax evasion, corruption, norms, legal enforcement JEL Classifications: H26, M14, D73 ________________________________ * We thank Haeil Jung, participants at the Public Economic Theory 2011 Conference and SPEA GM Seminar for helpful comments. Financial support from the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, is appreciated. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of the Treasury or the Office of Tax Analysis. † Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Tel: (202) 622-9858, Email: Jason.DeBacker@. ‡ School of Public and Environmental Affair