摘要激励措施反而扭曲人们的行为.doc

【摘要】激励措施反而扭曲人们的行为，为什么?众多研究在委托代理理论的分析框架内寻找了一些原因；将框架审之以逻辑，将假设比之以现实，本文发现了更多的原因；但扭曲之根源不在此，而在于，设计激励措施时，委托代理理论过于心切、步伐太快，越过了企业的本质。这样说是因为，委托代理理论一开始就认为代理人的最优策略不是最大化委托人效用函数，以至于无法分析出企业员工之间的真正纽带，以及这一纽带的本质。本文采取了截然相反的作法，首先就假定交易双方有相同的效用函数。含有这一假定的模型分析表明，企业是这样一种装置，通过它，权威的配置可以创造人的能力。权威的不同配置对应不同的企业能力。要使企业能力最大化就是要使权威配置最优化（而不是个人努力最大化）。使权威配置最优化的工具是权威（而不是金钱）。 【关键词】激励的扭曲 金钱 权威(数) 权威配置 委托代理 [abstract]Incentive plans distort behaviours, why? Some reasons have been found within the framework of principle-agent theory. Checking this framework by logic and testing its hypothesis by reality, We get some other explanations. But the fundamental reason of the distortion lies in the fact that, this theory, with an assumption that the optimal strategy of the agent does not optimize the utility function of the principal, neglect the nature of the firms and of authority. In order to find the real bond among the personnel and the nature of this bond, this paper employs a different approach by assuming that the transactors share the same utility function. The model demonstrates that, firm is but such a device through which authority is distributed, with the result of capability being created. Different distribution of authority corresponds to different firm capability. To maximize firm capability requires optimizing authority distribution, of which distribution can be realized by the instrument of authority (not of money). [key words] distortion of incentives money authority(quantity) distribution of authority principle-agent 致谢：感谢我的导师唐未兵教授。是导师的《西方经济学》和《股份制经济学》课使我发现这个前沿课题。也是导师的鼓励和指导使我七易其稿。 作者简介：张苏，男，1975年生，湖南华容人。湖南师范大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生。研究方向为企业理论、数理经济学。在《经济管理》、《经济理论与经济管理》等刊物上发表过学术论文。联系电话：0731-8645639Email?：zhagsu@? zhagsu@263.net通信地址：410081? 湖南师范大学经济研究所激励措施的困境与出路 The Predicament And Opportunities of Incentive Plans 一 代理人会“偷懒”(shirking)、“搭便车”(free-riding)、搞“机会主义”(opportunism)，还“献媚”(currying favor)、“耍花招”(politicking)，甚至在背地里挖“道德陷阱”(moral-hazard)；而委托人几乎看不到她的“行动”，测不准她的行动对企业的价值(firm value)。为了“减少