控制权配置与财务报告舞弊制约还是放纵.pdfVIP

Modern Management 现代管理, 2017, 7(6), 357-372 Published Online December 2017 in Hans. /journal/mm /10.12677/mm.2017.76048 Allocation of Control Rights and Financial Report Fraud: Restricting or Indulging Dan Zhang, Lin Liu Institute of Management, Donghua University, Shanghai th th th Received: Nov. 14 , 2017; accepted: Nov. 28 , 2017; published: Dec. 5 , 2017 Abstract As the key link of corporate governance, scholars have not reached consensus on the dividing me- thod of allocation of control rights. The paper investigates the effects of allocation of control rights on financial report fraud: restricting or indulging. Research findings are as follows: First, the listed company which is faced with financial distress is more inclined to implement financial report fraud. Second, the allocation of control rights twists the relationship between financial distress and financial report fraud. Specific allocation of control rights’ mode such as shareholder control will indulge company’s financial report fraud. Last but not the least, in Chinese capital market, corporate governance is the most important factor in financial report fraud. As the core part of corporate governance, the allocation of control rights is particularly important. There are three main innovations in this study: First, based on the consideration of shareholders, managers and the board of directors’ role in allocation of control rights, the paper divides allocation of control rights into four modes: shareholders control, shareholders control as the board of directors su- pervises, managers co