国企经营者薪酬兑现与企业绩效的实证分析研发.docVIP

国企经营者薪酬兑现与企业绩效的实证研究 摘 要：企业经营者薪酬兑现制度是激励与约束机制的重要内容，其即时性可以实现对企业经营者的短期激励，滞后性有利于经营者的长期激励和约束。本文选取我国部分国有控股制造业上市公司的经营者为研究对象，以经营者行为作为中介变量研究薪酬兑现方式与企业绩效之间的关系，研究表明：当期兑现对经营者短期导向行为有显著影响，对企业运营绩效有正向影响；延期兑现对经营者长期导向行为有显著影响，对企业成长绩效有正向影响。研究结论对于选择适合的经营者薪酬兑现时机及兑现方式提供了理论依据。 关键词：国有企业；薪酬兑现；经营者行为；企业绩效 a positive study of state-owned enterprise manager’s salary cash and enterprise performances yang shui-li, yao yao （faculty of economics and management, xi’an university of technology, xi’an 710054, china） abstract:the salary cash system enterprise of manager is an important item in the incentive and constraint mechanism. its real instant can achieve the short-term effective incentive for the enterprise manager, and its delay can realize the long-term incentive and constraint for the enterprise manager. this paper selects many enterprise managers of part of state-owned enterprises and the state-owned holding manufacturing listed company in our country as the research objects. the manager抯 behavior is as the intermediate variables for studying the function relationship between the salary cash means and the enterprise performances. the results show that the current pay encasement makes marked effect to the manager short-term guiding behaviors. it makes positive effect to the enterprise operating performance. the deferred pay encasement makes marked effect to the manager long-term guiding behaviors. it makes positive effect to the enterprise growing performance. the results from the positive study can provide the theoretical basis for the company. it shows that how to select the suitable cash opportunities and salary cash means. key words:state-owned enterprise; salary cash; manager behaviors; enterprise performances 1 引言 随着我国市场经济的发展，国有企业经营者薪酬制度的缺陷日渐突出，表现在：一方面企业经营者薪酬结构不合理、长短期激励失衡、不同行业之间经营者薪酬差距悬殊等；另一方面经营者薪酬与企业经营绩效背离，部分国有企业无论盈亏与否，经营者的薪酬水平仍然呈现上升趋势，这种现象越来越引起政府主管部门、学者及社会公众的质疑和关注。经营者薪酬兑现作为薪酬制度中最后也是至关重要的一个环节，逐渐暴露出存在的问题，表现为经营者重现金支付，轻股权期权支付。由于经营者受聘经营管理企业，存在任职期限，虽然这种“瓷饭碗”具有一定程度的压力及动力，但是经营者极可能更注重短期盈利、追求高额回报