国家没有区位优势时的外商直接投资竞争【外文翻译】.doc

本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译 外文题目：Competition for foreign direct investment when countries Are not sure of site values 出 处：International Review of Economics and Finance 作 者：Koray Kiymaz and Leon Taylor 原文： Competition for foreign direct investment when countries are not sure of site values Abstract The fiscal tug-of-war between two countries to play host to a foreign-owned firm is like a Nash game. Suppose that the countries are not sure how much the firm values the sites that they offer to it. Also suppose that the countries fashion their expectation of site value by assigning the same likelihood to each value that they deem possible. Then, if they are quite unsure about site values, they will offer small subsidies to the firm. If they are pretty sure about site values,they will offer large subsidies. Hereis the intuition behind theresults: When a country is unsure about the value of its site, it is also unsure if a stingy offer will drive the firm to its rival, so it may take the chance and make a stingy offer rather than a generous one. Introduction Governments often vie for a footloose firm by offering tax cuts or subsidies.Analyses of such a contest usually assume that its participants know full well its circumstances. In reality, its participants usually know little. For instance, government officials must guess at how much a firm values a site when they have no competitive bids to refer to. That is usually the case when government recruits industry because the lack of local land buyers is what spurs the government to seek buyers elsewhere. The government’s guess about the value of a site will affect its offer of incentives to a potential buyer. But if the government knows little about the value of its own site, then it is likely to know little about the value of a site els