政治关联企业的会计信息质量【外文翻译】.docVIP

本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 外文题目 The Quality of Accounting Information In Politically Connected Firms 外文出处 Journal of Accounting and Economics 外文作者 Paul K. Chaney，Mara Faccio，David Parsley 原文： The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that, because of a lesser need to respond to market pressures to increase the quality of information, connected companies can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information. In particular, lower quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample. In this paper we investigate whether earnings quality varies systematically with political connections in a wide sample of countries and politically connected firms. Overall, our results reveal that the presence of political connections is associated with a lower quality of accounting earnings. We document that political connections have incremental explanatory power beyond country, regulatory, and firm specific ownership characteristics. Ex-ante, one could have argued that because connected firms are subject to extensive controls and monitoring (including scrutiny by the media), political connections would, in fact, be associated with better earnings quality. This, however, is not the case. Based on the results in prior research, three explanations are consistent with our finding that the quality of earnings of politically connected firms is poorer than the quality of earnings of similar non-connected peers. First, as politically connected firms typically derive gains from their connections over and above the payments they make, insiders may hide,