代理问题与企业理论(中英)—by-laowen.docxVIP

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 代理问题与企业理论 摘要：This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. 本文试图说明证劵所有权和控制权的分离对于经济组织可能是有效形式的机理，尤其对于大型企业而言。We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.我们首先抛开企业在任何意义下一定有所有者的假定 。The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation.一定有企业家的假定也可以放在一边，至少对大型现代企业而言是的。 The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur—management and risk bearing—are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. 通常认为认为企业家具有管理和风险承担这两种职能，而这两种职能通常被看做是企业的分离的要素。The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. 企业总是有来自外部企业的竞争，这就不断促使对于整个团队和企业内部个人成员的表现监督机制不断进步。Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm. 企业的个人参与者，特别是对于管理者而言，在企业内部和外部都需要正视市场为他们的服务提供的准则和机会。 Economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the firms security holders.长期以来，经济学家就一直十分关注由一些不是企业证劵持有者的核心管理者进行企业决策所产生的激励问题。One outcome has been the development of behavioral and managerial theories of the firm which reject the classical model of an entrepreneur, or owner-manager, who single-mindedly operates the firm to maximize profits, in favor of theories that focus more on the motivations of a manager who controls but does not own and who has little resemblance to the classical economic man. 结果导致了企业行为理论和管理理论的发展，这些理论摒弃了古典模型中一个追求利润最大化的企业家或者企业—所有者的假定，而赞同集中研究控制企业但不拥有企业的管理者（这和古典理性人假定有很大的不同）的激励问题。Examples of this approach are Baumol (1959), Simon (1959), Cyert and March (1963), and William