An investment game with third-party intervention推荐.pdfVIP

Journal of Economic Behavior Organization 68 (2008) 18–28 An investment game with third-party intervention a,∗ ´ b ´ b,c Gary Charness , Ramon Cobo-Reyes , Natalia Jimenez a Department of Economics, University of California Santa Barbara, 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210, United States b Departamento de Teor´ıa e Historia Econ´omica, University of Granada, Campus Cartuja, s/n , E-18071, Granada, Spain c Departamento de Fundamentos del An´alisis Econ´omico, University of Alicante, Carretera de S. Vicente del Raspeig s/n, 03080, Alicante(S. Vicente del Raspeig), Spain Received 18 November 2006; received in revised form 23 February 2008; accepted 23 February 2008 Available online 6 March 2008 Abstract This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior in a variant of the Berg et al. [Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K., 1995. Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122–142] “Investment Game”. A third-party’s material payoff is not affected by the decisions made by the other participants, but this person may choose to punish a responder who has been overly selfish. The concern over this possibility may serve to discipline potentially selfish responders. We also explore a treatment in which the third party may also choose to reward a sender who has received a low net payoff as a result of the responder’s action. We find a strong and significant effect of third-party punishment in both punishment regimes, as the amount sent by the