CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FARM POLICY推荐.pdfVIP

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FARM POLICY JULIAN ALSTON and COLIN CARTER* Two types of public choice models have been applied to model the political economy of farm programs: the selfwilled government (SWG) model and the clearinghouse government {CHG) model. In terms of theory, the two models are very similar but most analysts prefer the CHG model. In terms of empirical work, the CHG model has done a little more-but not much more-to firther our understanding of the causes offarm programs. Reviewing the theoretical and applied literature indicates that one should extend and refine the models so as to allow explicitlyfor a larger number of interest groups (especially agribusiness andforeign interests), to allow multiple policy instruments to be applied jointly, and to explain the choice{s) of policy instruments jointly with the rate ofprotection. I. INTRODUCTION In addition to the work measuring the The U.S. government intervenes in consequences of farm policy, a growing nearly all aspects of food production, pro- body of literature now attempts to explain cessing, and trade. The price, quantity, and the causes of farm policy using a public economic welfare consequences of farm choice paradigm (Rausser and Freebairn, policy have been well documented (e.g., 1974; Sarris and Freebairn, 1983; Rieth- World Bank, 1986;Economic Report of the muller and Roe, 1986; Paarlberg and Ab- President, 1986;Roningen and Dixit, 1988; bott, 1986; Baliscan and Roumasset, 1987; Sumner, 1991).Measuring the incidence of Gardner 1987a; Vanzetti and Kennedy, these