Banking Panics and Business Cycles Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States推荐.pdfVIP

7 Banking Panics and Business Cycles* G A RY B. G O RTO N * 7.1. INTRODUCTION The nearly universal experience of banking panics has led many governments to regulate the banking industry. Economists, too, have increasingly focused on panics as evidence of bank uniqueness. Yet, competing theories to explain bank- ing panics have never been tested. Are banking panics caused by the same rela- tions governing consumer behavior during nonpanic times? Are panics random events, or are panics associated with movements in expected returns, in particu- lar, with movements in perceived risk which are predictable on the basis of prior information? If so, what is the relevant information? Using newly constructed data this study addresses these questions by examination of the seven panics during the U.S. National Banking Era (1863–1914). Depositor behavior under subsequent monetary regimes is also examined. In all, one hundred years of depositor behavior are examined. * The comments and assistance of Andy Abel, Robert Barro, Phillip Cagan, Bob DeFina, Mike Dotsey, Mark Edwards, Stanley Engerman, Lauren Feinstone, Claudia Goldin, Jack Guttentag, Robert King, Erv Miller, Jeremy Siegel, Alan Stockman, John Taylor, Steve Zeldes, two anony- mous referees, and the University of Pennsylvania Macro Lunch Group, were helpful and greatly appreciated. They are not responsible for errors. The research assistance of Earl Pearsall, Elaine Ross, and Wendy Tann was invaluable for this work, as was the programming assistance of Steve Franklin, and Wells Vinton. Thanks to Robert Avery for help with the Tobit program, CRAW- TRAN. This study was initiated while the author was at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The