Free riding and punishment and welfare and culture推荐.pdf

Free riding and punishment (and welfare and culture) ERNST FEHR AND SIMON GACHTERCooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, American Economic Review 90(4), September 2000, 980-994 • “A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that there is indeed a widespread willingness of the cooperators to punish the free-riders. Our results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. In addition, we provide evidence that free-riders are punished the more heavily the more they deviate from the cooperation levels of the cooperators. Potential free-riders, therefore, can avoid or at least reduce punishment by increasing their cooperation levels. This, in turn, suggests that in the presence of punishment opportunities there will be less free riding. Testing this conjecture is the other major aim of our paper.” Voluntary contribution game (with n=4) • Basic (and first stage) game (without punishments) : 1 Π = y –g + a Σg i i i j • Final payoff of games with punishments 1 i j Π = Π [1 –(1/10)P ] – Σ(c(p )) i i j i j are punishment points assigned by I where p i j to j, and Pi = min(Σp , 10). j i Treatments • Between subjects: – Strangers (random group each period) – Partners (fixed group for 10 periods) • Within subjects – Without punishment – With punishment (counterbalanced) Reported results • RESULT 1: The existence of punishment