之四十一43.ppt

Defense Economics;Abstract ;Executive Summary (1of 4);Executive Summary Continued (2 of 4);Executive Summary Continued (3 of 4);Executive Summary Continued (4 of 4);Current and Near-Term GEO-POL OverviewUnsettled and Challenging;International Defense EconomicsOverview;International Defense Economics (Contd)Overview;Ratio of Defense Spending and Escalating Weapons Costs the Single Most Significant Influence on Acquisitions, Force Size and Mix, Arms Sales, and the Global Defense Industry Previous Efforts to Reduce Costs Largely Unsuccessful Major Defense Industrial Restructuring Has Not Slowed Price Escalation Streamlined Acquisition Procedures, Including Less Oversight, Use of Commercial Products, Capabilities-Based Process Not The Answer Still Waiting for Significant Hi-Tech Solutions Without Significantly Lower Weapon Costs, Foreign Sales Will Continue to Decrease Without Foreign Sales and Significant National Demand, Production Runs Will Be Short, Fewer Units Produced, and Unit Costs Will Continue To Outpace Defense Budgets Amortization of Weapons Costs Critical To Lower Prices Easy Answer is to Reduce Costs and Sell More – But – The Devil is in the Details;Defense Spending Decline Bottomed in ’98 – Slow Climb Since Military RD Spending Also Bottomed in ’98 Arms Transfers Trend Still Down Since Mid-80s Higher Priority Economic Considerations Gaining Greater Share of National Budgets Sophisticated Weapons Cost More Than Systems Being Replaced Fewer Costly New Hi-Tech Systems Being Acquired, Developed Greater Competition For Fewer Arms Sales Leaner Defense Industries Sophisticated Systems Available, but Few Can Afford Many Transnational/Terrorist Threats Don’t Need Large Budgets, Expensive Weapons;Notional Worldwide Defense Spending Trends;Defense Spending Economic Factors;Defense SpendingKey Economic Data;Macro-Economic Factors InhibitDefense Budgets;Worldwide GDP Defense Spending Trends;2002 Economic Data (1of 4);2002 Economic Data (2 of 4);2002 Economic D