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Asian Economic and Financial Review, 2013, 3(12):1583-1597
Asian Economic and Financial Review
journal homepage: http :///journal-detail.php?id=5002
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND DEBT
DECISIONS IN AN EMERGING MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN
Shahab U Din
Faculty Member, Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology Wah
Campus, Pakistan
Attiya Javid
Professor at Department of Economics, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Islamabad, Pakistan
Muhammad Imran
PhD-Scholar, Department of Management Science, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology
Islamabad, Pakistan
ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of concentration of ownership both external block ownership and
managerial share ownership on capital structure decision of Pakistani non-financial firms. The
panel data is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure with external and
internal ownership structure and fixed effect model gives a better explanation of the model. The
relationship suggested by analysis between external ownership concentration and leverage ratio,
patronage the “passive voting hypothesis” that large external shareholders select corporate
managers through their voting power by ignoring the interest of the small shareholders. While
large insider ownership significantly enhances the voting power and influence the corporate
decisions. Which result difficult to control manager
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