它和欧洲各国之中央银行的关系.pptVIP

Chapter Seven THE STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL BANKS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Formal Structure of the Fed Federal Reserve Districts Informal Structure of the Fed Central Bank Independence Factors making Fed independent 1. Members of Board have long terms 2. Fed is financially independent: This is most important Factors making Fed dependent 1. Congress can amend Fed legislation 2. President appoints Chairmen and Board members and can influence legislation Overall: Fed is quite independent Central Bank Independence Other Central Banks 1. Bank of Canada and Bank of Japan: fair degree of independence, but not all on paper 2. Bank of England and Bank of Japan made more independent in 1997 and 1998, respectively. 3. European Central Bank most independent 4. Trend to greater independence Explaining Central Bank Behavior Theory of Bureaucratic Behavior 1. Is an example of principal-agent problem 2. Bureaucracy often acts in own interest Implications for Central Bank Behavior: 1. Act to preserve independence：如預算不讓國會控制 2. Try to avoid controversy: often plays games 3. Seek additional power over banks Explaining Central Bank Behavior Should Fed Be Independent? Case For: 1. Independent Fed likely has longer run objectives, politicians dont: evidence is that get better policy outcomes 2. Avoids political business cycle 3. Less likely budget deficits will be inflationary Explaining Central Bank Behavior Case Against: 1. Fed may not be accountable 2. Hinders coordination of monetary and fiscal policy 3. Fed has often performed badly Central Bank Independence and Macro Performance in 17 Countries Copyright ? 2000 Addison Wesley Longman Slide #7-* Part III Central Banking and the Conduct of Monetary Policy 它和歐洲各國之中央銀行的關係，就如同美國Fed的架構 With總統與國會 如report最有利之M指標，或常修正M目標或不願意將FOMC report公布 如：1987將reserve requirement擴及至non-member bank 如：?通膨 短期目標：失業率、利率 ?選前採寬鬆政策 Budget deficit?政府發債?叫央行買公債?通膨 外交、國防是否也該獨立? 誰來監督Fed? Copyright ? 2000 Addison Wesley Longman Slide #7-*