国外博弈论课件lecture18汇.pptVIP

June 13, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 18 June 13, 2003 Lecture 18 Dynamic Games of Complete Information Dynamic Games of Complete and Imperfect Information Outline of dynamic games of complete information Dynamic games of complete information Extensive-form representation Dynamic games of complete and perfect information Game tree Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium Backward induction Applications Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information More applications Repeated games Today’s Agenda Review of previous class Tariffs and imperfect international competition (2.2.C of Gibbons) Repeated games Information set Gibbons’ definition: An information set for a player is a collection of nodes satisfying: the player has the move at every node in the information set, and when the play of the game reaches a node in the information set, the player with the move does not know which node in the information set has (or has not) been reached. All the nodes in an information set belong to the same player The player must have the same set of feasible actions at each node in the information set. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium A Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is subgame-perfect if the strategies of the Nash equilibrium constitute or induce a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the game. A subgame of a game tree begins at a singleton information set (an information set containing a single node), and includes all the nodes and edges following the singleton information set, and does not cut any information set; that is, if a node of an information set belongs to this subgame then all the nodes of the information set also belong to the subgame. Example Tariffs and imperfect international competition (2.2.C of Gibbons) Two identical countries, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose their tariff rates, denoted t1, t2, respectively. Firm 1 from country 1 and firm 2 from country 2 produce a homogeneous product for both home consumption and export. After observing the tariff rate