Free Will, Moral Responsibility and the Physical Mind Meetup自由意志，道德责任和体育精神的聚会.ppt

* - All statements here, including this statement, are within a 3rd person, intersubjective effort to model reality, including the nature of consciousness, to the best of our ability: what’s going on? We are all individual subjects, but we all proffer statements intended to be true not just of our experience, but of the world beyond our subjectivities, hence we’re engaged in a 3rd person, intersubjective project to explain subjective consciousness. * * - No one has anyone ever observed a pain or any other conscious state; we don’t even observe our own experiences; rather we subjectively consist of them as we observe the world (see Killing the observer). Experiences are intersubjectively invisible, unmeasurable or, even stronger, intersubjectively non-existent. The privacy of consciousness is a 3rd person fact about it that helps to generate the hard problem since it’s difficult to claim an identity between something categorically private (one’s experience) and anything that’s public (like one’s brain) – see the section on explanatory non-starters. The other most difficult aspect of the hard problem is the qualitativeness of the basic elements of consciousness. Could be that both privacy and qualitativeness are entangled entailments of being a sufficiently complex RS - see hard problem section. - the real me is the conscious mind-soul, the controller that rides above the physical brain. - Ray Tallis says correctly: “I believe there is a fundamental, but not obvious, reason why that explanation will always remain incomplete - or unrealisable. This concerns the disjunction between the objects of science and the contents of consciousness. Science begins when we escape our subjective, first-person experiences into objective measurement, and reach towards a vantage point the philosopher Thomas Nagel called the view from nowhere. You think the table over there is large, I may think it is small. We measure it and find that it is 0.66 metres square. We now characterise the