半年报自愿审计与银行贷款：基于中国上市公司的经验证据.docVIP

半年报自愿审计与银行贷款：基于中国上市公司的经验证据 - 1 - 杜兴强，曾泉* （厦门大学管理学院,福建 厦门 361005） 5 摘要：本文手工收集了 2002-2009 年中国上市公司的半年报自愿审计的数据，实证研究了半 年报自愿审计对上市公司银行债务融资的影响，以及与此相关的盈余管理与过度投资行为。 研究结果表明，半年报自愿审计的上市公司下半年新增贷款总额显著更高、平均利率显著更 低；进一步的研究发现，为了获得银行贷款，半年报自愿审计的上市公司进行了显著向上的10 盈余管理，且获得银行贷款后，显著进行了过度投资。上述结果联合表明，半年报自愿审计 的上市公司通过盈余管理、通过操纵的财务报表获得了利率更低与更多的银行贷款，但导致 了更为严重的过度投资行为。从而，半年报自愿审计市场的独立性堪忧。 关键词：审计；半年报自愿审计；银行贷款；借款利率；过度投资；盈余管理 中图分类号：F239；F832 15 Voluntary Interim Audit and bank Loans: Evidence from China DU Xingqiang, ZENG Quan (School of Management, Xiamen University, Fujian Xiamen 361005) 20 Abstract: Using hand-collected data on voluntary interim audit during the period of 2002-2009, this study examines the influence of voluntary interim audit on bank loans and further investigates the impacts of voluntary interim audit on earnings management and over-investment. Our findings show that firms with voluntary interim audit have significantly higher amount of incremental loans and significantly lower cost of the debt in the second semi-year than their counterparts. However, 25 further evidence shows that firms with voluntary interim audit conduct upward earnings management and over-invest after they obtain bank loans. Above results, taken together, reveal that firms with voluntary interim audit obtain more bank loans via higher level of earnings management and financial statement manipulation, which lead to serious over-investment. In a nutshell, voluntary interim audit may bring out the impairment of auditor independence. 30 Key words: audit; voluntary interim audit; bank loans; the cost of the debt; over-investment; earnings management 35 40 - 2 - 0 引言 2011 年 3 月以来，一批中资概念股在美国资本市场遭遇恐慌性抛售风潮、停牌或退市1， 并在美国或香港遭受诉讼或调查。相应地，负责这些海外上市公司的审计师们在财务欺诈的45 讨伐声中承受着巨大的压力，随之而来的审计独立性的问题又一次引发了各界关注。 由于缺乏相应的特定制度环境，萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)之后，相关的 研究主要集中在审计独立性与非审计业务、审计任期以及审计师轮换之间的关联上[1-7]，而 针对审计业务自身与审计独立性的研究缺乏相关经验证据。与年报的强制审计相比，企业自 主选择的半年报自愿审计更能客观、充分地反映企业实施审计