Ch 11 Pay For Performance 人力资源_讲义教材PPT(英文).pptVIP

11 Pay For Performance Introduction Example of Safelite (1) Average productivity per worker rose whooping 44%. (2) Turnover fall dramatically (3) Labor cost per window: $44.43 → $35.24 Structure of this chapter (1) Economic Theory: Agency Theory (2) Social and psychological consideration (3) Integration of the two perspectives Compensation-related Terms Efficiency wages Gainsharing Improshare Management by objectives Pay for skill Scanlon plans Economic Theory: Agency Theory Assumptions (1) The Employee is averse to effort. (2) The Employee is averse to risk. (3) The parties cannot contract on the level of effort. Analysis (1) Getting more compensation the greater is x (2) B is greater than zero and b is smaller than the “full” value of the unit of output to the employer (3) The services provided to the employer may not be known when it come time to pay off the employee. (4) Incentive compensation works better the better the compensation -linked variables is as a signal about the employee’s level of effort e. (5) Compensation is not the only motivator Variation (1) Screening Sorting (2) Rewarding the Type and Quality of Effort (3) Benchmarking and Tournaments (4) Multiperiod Effects: The Ratcher Effect (5) Multiperiod Effects: Time Hurdle Levels (6) Multiperiod Effects: Tying Workers to Firms (7) Group Incentive Schemes Group Incentive Schemes The Free-rider problem and its resolution --- peer pressure --- individual member internalize the group’s welfare Group Size --- symbolic content of ESOP plans and bonuses Group Composition --- within- vs. between-group homogeneity The Division of Rewards Within the Group --- value of different workers in the group Legitimacy Rewarding Individuals versus Teams --- job design and reward system are aligned with one another and consistent with other HR practices The Case Again