外文文献：一个国家主导的金融制度的陷阱：中国案例.pdfVIP

Pitfalls of a State-dominated Financial System: The Case of China1 Genevieve Boyreau-Debray The World Bank and Shang-Jin Wei International Monetary Fund, CCFR, NBER, and CEPR Abstract State-owned financial institutions have been proposed as a way to address market failure, though the literature has also highlighted their pathological problems. This paper examines pitfalls of a state- dominated financial system in the case of China, including possible segmentation of the internal capital market due to local government interference and mis-allocation of capital. Even without formal legal prohibition to capital movement across regions, we find that capital mobility within China is low. Furthermore, to the extent some capital moves around the country, the government (as opposed to the private sector) tends to reallocate capital systematically away from more productive regions towards less productive ones. In this context, a smaller role of the government in the financial sector might increase economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth. JEL Classification Number: G1, F3 Keywords: China, internal capital market, financial integration, risk sharing. 1 Corrresponding author: Shang-Jin Wei, Chief, Trade and Investment Division, International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20431. E-mail: swei@, and web page: /~wei. The authors would like to thank Ray Brooks, Chun Chang, Martin Feldstein, Simon Johnson, Nick Lardy, Huayong Ge, Albert Keidel, Raghu Rajan, Eswar Prasad, Gang Yi, and seminar and conference participants at the National Bureau of Economic Research, the IMF, and the Hong Kong University for very useful