Winners and Losers Ditributional Impacts of Highway User Fees赢家和输家的公路使用费分配的影响.ppt

The SUITS INDEX The Suits Index, bounded between -1 and 1 A value of -1 implies the lowest income group bears the entire burden of the tax; A value of 1 implies the highest income group bears the entire tax burden. A value of 0 implies the tax is proportional. OLS MODEL VARIABLES Our OLS model is based on the following equation M = f(Pf,I,U,C,SUB,CHILD,WORKER,MALE) Where M is the total annual miles driven by the household, Pf is the fuel cost per mile under the gasoline tax I is annual household income U is a dummy variable, = 1 if urban, = 0 else C is the number of vehicles the household owns. SUB = 1 if the household has more than one type of vehicle, = 0 else CHILD number of children WORK number of workers MALE = 1 if respondent male, = 0 else CONCLUSIONS/REMARKS (cont’d.) If we go to VMT, very small impact: likely to have little impact on driving relative to recent increases in gasoline prices Policy question: If we don’t go to VMT and can’t pass higher gasoline taxes, how do we fund roads? Alternative funding sources? Local options taxes : sales taxes, local gasoline taxes Higher Registration fees From General Funds Bonding Do we really want greater reliance on non-user fees? What effect would these taxes have on regressivity relative to the VMT and gas taxes?  Conclusions The Dynamic Model Comparison of the change in tax revenues makes the policy impact appear less regressive than the static model (See Suits Indices) However, is the appropriate measure the change in tax paid or the change in consumer surplus? ALL of the VMT-fee policy scenarios have a considerably smaller impact on incidence than the increase in gasoline prices in recent years caused by external forces Different VMT-fee structures have different impacts on incidence or equity, but the difference is not large Other Possibilities for a VMT VMT-fees may also be designed to achieve sustainabil