大股东的支撑与掏空行为分析——基于三联集团例的分析.docVIP

大股东的支撑与掏空行为分析 ——基于三联集团案例的分析 教 学 点： 宁波电大余姚学院 专 业： 会计学（本） 入学时间： 二○一四年三月 学生姓名： 高瞻远 学 号： 1433101201132 指导教师： 顾建莉 二○一六年五月大股东的支撑与掏空行为分析 ——基于三联集团案例的分析 目录 abstract 2 内容摘要 3 一、文献综述 4 （一）大股东支撑行为理论 4 （二）大股东掏空行为理论 5 （三）大股东支撑和掏空行为对称理论 6 二、案例背景 6 （一）案例综述 6 （二）三联商社公司背景 7 （三）三联集团公司背景 8 三、 案例分析 9 （一）大股东的支撑行为 9 （二）大股东的掏空行为 12 四、政策建议 18 参考文献 20 Abstract In recent years, more and more cases of listing Corporation shareholders use loan guarantees, related-party transactions, capital occupation and empty or invade the interests of small shareholders. We found that large shareholders, not only occupy the interests of small shareholders, they will also have to invest the behavior of company. Support and tunneling behavior is the behavior of transfer large shareholders in order to maximize their own interests and take the direction of different interests. That supports the intention is for listed or improve the performance of the company, and the tunneling behavior is of practical interest to the big shareholders, causing damage to the value of the company and the interests of small shareholders. In this paper, the Sanlian Group case to explore verification support and tunneling behavior of Chinese listing Corporation shareholders, the motive and the goal, as well as the major shareholder support and tunneling behavior is the corresponding. Specific analysis of large shareholders to support and tunneling through the manner in which the financial impact of the company and. And put forward the corresponding countermeasures and governance mechanism. Key words: supporting behaviour tunneling governance mechanism 大股东的支撑与掏空行为分析 ——基于三联集团案例的分析 内容摘要 近年来，上市公司大股东利用贷款担保、关联交易、资金占用等方式掏空或侵占中小股东利益的案例越来越多。我们发现，大股东不只是单纯侵占中小股东利益，他们也会有对公司进行投资等支撑行为。而大股东的支撑与掏空行都是为了使自己的利益获得最大化而采取的相反方向的利益输送行为。即大股东支撑行为的目的是为了公司能够上市或者改善公司财务业绩，而掏空行为则是为了将上市公司或者中小股东的利益输送给 大股东，对公司价值和小股东利益造成损害。 本文以三联集团的案例来探究验证我国上市公司大股东的支撑与掏空行为的动机和目的，以及大股东的支撑与掏空行为是对应的。具体分析大股东通过何种方式进行支撑与掏空及其对公司的财务影响。并提出相对应的对策和治理机