基于会展市场“说谎行为”地博弈分析.docVIP

基于会展市场“说谎行为”的博弈分析 陈骞 周立波 （重庆财经职业学院 重庆 永川 402160） 摘要：会展业作为一个新兴行业已成为中国经济新的增长点，从展会策划到展会举办的较长过程中存在信息不对称现象,这种现象将导致会展行业说谎行为盛行。这种欺骗行为从长期看将严重阻碍会展业的发展和整个会展市场规模的扩大，会展企业要树立长期博弈理念,通过创立展会品牌、提高管理和服务水平、参与展会认证、邀请第三方监督等措施,向市场透露诚信信息，以增加会展市场中参展商决策的信息含量，提高会展市场运行效率。本文主要是利用博弈的方法对会展市场的“说谎行为”进行分析，并据此提出会展企业对说谎行为的对策措施和规范整个会展业发展的政策建议，对规范会展市场“说谎行为”起到借鉴作用。 关键词: 会展市场 说谎行为 博弈分析 博弈 Abstract: As an emerging profession,convention and exhibition industry has become new growth point of Chinas economy,but information asymmetry phenomenon is always existing in the long process from convention and exhibition plan to holding,which will cause the popularity of lying behaviorin convention and exhibition industry. Looking at the long term, the fraud will seriously hinder the development and the expansion of market scale of convention and exhibition industry. convention and exhibition industry must establish the idea of long Game, through establishing brand, enhancement management and the service level, participating Show authenticate, and inviting the third party to inspect, to disclose faith information to the market and increase the information content of Exhibitors’ decision-making in the convention and exhibition market and enhance the market operating efficiency. Some counter measures and suggestions to solve the problem of normalizing the development of convention and exhibition industry are proposed in this paper after “lying behavior” in convention and exhibition industry being analyzed. Keywords: convention and exhibition,lying behavior,game analysis,game theory 在会展行业，展会组织者的欺骗行为随处可见。吹牛浮夸，偷梁换柱，更有 “携款潜逃”。 展会产品的“服务性”和参展签约时间与展会实际举办时间的不一致性，决定了会展市场必然是一个面临更多信息不对称问题的市场。因为一方面服务产品的质量标准难以衡量，另一方面招展于举办时间之间存在较长的间隔，这些特征决定了在会展市场上展会的组织方能够比较确切的了解展会的运转情况，而参展与参会一方，只有在展会召开期间，才能够确切了解参加人员的数量、构成等有价值的信息。正是这种信息的不对称性，加大了处于信息弱势一方（通常是参展商）的市场风险， 滋生了各式各样的浮夸和说谎行为。 为了弄清会展业中说谎行为的理论根源及其可能导致的后果，本文以下部分构筑两个简单的博弈模型，分别用以证明为什么在信息不对称的情况下，“说谎行为”会成为会展业的“普遍现象”，而且在“说大谎”和“说小谎”之间，展会组织者更倾向于“说大谎”，在此基础上分析企业短期博弈和长期博弈所采取的不同策略，同时说明会展业中的“说谎