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Econometrica , Vol. 70, No. 6 (November, 2002), 2421–2453
INFORMATIONAL SIZE AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
By Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite1
We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The
presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com-
patibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that
the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if
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