A_Theory_of_Social_Custom英文资料.pdf

A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence George A. Akerlof The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Jun., 1980),749-775. Stable URL: /sici?sici=0033-55332994%3A4%3C749%3AATOSCO%3E2.O.CO%3B2-N The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently published by The MIT Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at /about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.j /journals/mitpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact jstor-info@. / Wed Feb 18 21:37:45 2004 A THEORY OF SOCIAL CUSTOM, OF WHICH UNEMPLOYMENT MAY BE ONE CONSEQUENCE* This paper examines adherence to social customs. Models of social customs are found to be inherently multi-equilibrial. I t is found that social customs which are disadvantageous to the individual may nevertheless persist without erosion, if indi- viduals are sanctioned by loss of reputafion for disobedience of the custom. One ex- ample of such a social custom