基于Stackelberg博弈的农业供应链金融模式研究-物流工程专业论文.docxVIP

基于 Stackelberg 博弈的农业供应链金融模式研究 摘 要 农业是我国国民经济的基础，在我国国民经济发展中起着重要 作用。近几年，我国农业呈产业化趋势快速发展，但农业发展离不开 金融支持，农业中小企业对资金需求也日益增加。由于农业本身固有 低收益、高成本、高风险及周期性等特殊性，致使我国农业企业普遍 规模小、信誉低、能力弱、风险高，从而难以从资本市场获得融资， 融资困难已经成为阻碍我国农业中小企业发展瓶颈。农业供应链金融 出现为缓解我国农业中小企业融资困难问题提供了有效途径。 在 Stackelberg 博弈模型的框架下，本文基于“主体+债项”研究 方法，构建存货质押融资两种模式下商业银行、农业融资企业期望利 润模型。进一步利用逆向归纳法求解融资企业最优决策和商业银行最 优质押率决策，并且讨论了下侧风险控制条件下银行的最优决策。本 文在前文研究基础上利用数值仿真研究计算了融资企业和商业银行 的最优决策，并研究了他们各自的决策与贷款利率和融资企业信用风 险等参数之间的关系。 结果表明，在考虑农产品价格和需求随机波动情况下，银行与融 资企业都存在最优决策，并且最优决策与融资利率、回购比例等参数 成正相关，与质押融资期限、融资企业信用风险等参数成负相关关系， I 这对于银行和农业中小企业融资决策具有一定理论参考价值和实用 性。 关键词：农业中小企业，供应链金融，存货质押融资，Stackelberg 博弈，质押率 II RESEARCH ON MODEL OF AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY CHAIN FINANCE BASED ON STACKELBERG GAME MODELS ABSTRACT Agriculture is the foundation of our national economy, plays an important role in Chinas national economic development.In recent years, Chinas agriculture showed a trend of rapid development of industrialization, agricultural development is inseparable from financial support, agricultural SME demand for capital is also increasing.As agriculture itself inherently low income, high cost, high risk and periodicity particularity,Resulting in Chinas agricultural enterprises are generally small-scale, low-prestige, low capacity, high-risk, making it difficult to obtain financing from capital markets,Financing difficulties have become an obstacle to the development of SMEs in Chinas agricultural bottleneck.Agricultural supply chain finance appear to ease the financing difficulties of SMEs in the agricultural issue provides an effective way. In the framework of Stackelberg game model,Based on research subject + debt approach,Construction of two modes inventory financing commercial banks, agricultural finance companies expected profit model.Further use of backward induction method for solving the optimal financing corporate and commercial banking optimal decisions pledge rate decisions, and discussed optimal decisions under conditions of risk control at the side of banks.