公司债务融资会计学专业论文.docxVIP

ABSTRACTThis ABSTRACT This dissertation gives deep and systemic research corporate debt finance．it includes：Why is there debt；the role it Call play in corporate governance，corporate growth，and product competition when debt and its various attributes are given；the determination and dynamic adjustments of the optimal debt level；the adverse consequences of debt financing；and the financial systems for corporate debt finance． Tbe structure is as follows： The Introduction presents the necessity of this Study,the review of existing papers ofrelateA su巧ects，the staucture，characteristics，and the primary innovations in this study． Chapter one illuminates the endogenous optimality of the debt contract， Asymmetric information or the incompleteness of the contract makes the optimal 商隐ncing conllact has the features which雠consistent with the debt cent／act we observed矗the real world． Chapter two expounds the govemaneB role and goveraance mechanisms of cc晖ol咖debt to control the manager．The limitations of Chinese banks’role in corporate governance are also investigated． Chapter thre把analyzes 1he debt financiag fe破I埘‰such as the debt leVek the maturity,callability,being convertible，priority,and Sources，which firms with abtmdant growth opportunities should choose．Hence some policy implications are derived for Chinese financing systems．This chapter also includes the influences of debtKnaae缸gonfirmsproductcompetition． Chapter four expatiates the impacts of managerial incentives provided by the shareholders on the corporate debt level。credit risk and firm value．Under certain conditions，when the incentives ale weak，debt level hirgh enough is the manager’S credible precommitment to his efforts to the outside investors，and the sufficient condition for the investment projeet to be fully financed．When the incentives are strong,however,the manager will choose a debt level that is below the one which could maximize the firm value．When the manager’S effort is given，the dynamic 删ustments of