股利政策争议问题.doc

PAGE 原文： Dividend policy: The Issues 1. Introduction The determinants of dividend policy are a continuing puzzle, as noted by Black (1976). In this paper we review the major issues in dividend policy and relate them to some of the themes explored in companion papers in this volume. The paper is d ivided into five sections. Section 2 surveys the literature on the information signalling properties of dividends. Section 3 discusses some tax issues related to dividend policy and section 4 draws on some agency costs explanations for dividend payments. The conclusion draws together the arguments and highlights some of the unresolved issues. 2. Dividend policy and information signalling In their classic paper, Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a cogent argument for the claim that dividend policy does not affect the value of the firm. They assume a world without transactions costs and taxes, a given investment policy and fully informed investors. In these circumstances it follows that the irrelevance of dividend policy, given investment policy, is obvious, once you think of it(p.414). With a given level of investment, if a firm chooses to pay a dollar more of dividend now, it will have to raise an extra dollar of external finance to support its investment: The higher current dividend to existing shareholders will be exactly offset by a decrease in future dividends as the firm must now pay dividends to its new shareholders. In the absence of tax effects and transactions costs and given full information, the value of the firm to existing shareholders will not be affected by its dividend policy. Dividend policy is therefore irrelevant. Miller and Modigliani (1961) note that the informational content of dividends is assumed absent from their model. They note, however, that in practice where a firm has adopted a policy of dividend stabilization with a long-established and generally appreciated target payout ratio, investors are likely to (and have a good reason to) in