信息不对称视角下的剩余索取权分配测度.docxVIP

信息不对称视角下的剩余索取权分配测 度 徐雷屈沙郑理 湖南商学院经济与贸易学院深圳大学中国经济特区 研究中心 摘要： 基于中国综合社会调查(CGSS) 2013微观层面数据，本文借助双边随机边界模 型测度劳资双方议价能力对剩余索取权分配的影响，结果显示:信息不对称使得 劳动者愿意接受的最低劳动报酬与企业愿意支付的最高劳动报酬之间存在剩余， 这一剩余的分配主要取决于劳资双方在谈判屮议价能力的大小。具体而言，劳动 者的议价能力使其获得的劳动报酬高出基准劳动报酬17.69%,企业的议价能力 使其支付的劳动报酬低于基准劳动报酬23. 59%,两者的博弈结果使劳动者获得 的实际劳动报酬比基准劳动报酬低5.90%。从样木异质性来看，国有企业及其员 工的议价能力均是最弱的，外资企业及其员工的议价能力均是最强的，而外资 企业获得的劳动报酬净剩余最大。此外，劳动合同、工会对劳动者的剩余获取能 力的影响并不明显。基于这样的现实，劳动者在薪酬谈判中的信息为势地位不利 于中国劳动报酬占GDP比重的提高，因此保障和提高劳动者的剩余索取权成为 破解劳资经济利益分配不公平难题的政策着力点所在。 关键词： 信息不对称;议价能力;剩余索取权;双边随机边界模型; 作者简介：徐雷湖南商学院经济与贸易学院讲师，长沙市，410000; 作者简介：屈沙深圳大学中国经济特区研究中心博士研究生，深圳市，518060; 作者简介：郑理中国建设银行湖南省分行职员，长沙市，410000。 收稿日期：2016-10-20 基金：国家社会科学基金重大项冃“我国收入分配体制改革动态跟踪和效果评估 研究” (12ZD049) Measurement of Residual Claim Allocation from Information Asymmetry XU Lei QU Sha ZHENG Li Hunan University of Commerce; Shenzhen University; Hunan Province Branch of China Construetion Bank; Abstract： With the CGSS2013 data, the paper uses the two-tier stochastic frontier model to measure effects of the bargaining power between employers and employees on the residual claim allocation. The results show that information asymmetry makes a surplus between the minimum labor remuneration which the workers is willing to accept and the highest wage which the enterprisc is willing to pay, and the distribution of the surplus mainly depends on the bargaining power in the negotiations between employers and employees. Specifically, the workers negotiation ability can make their wage 17. 69% higher than the benchmark labor remuneration, and the beirgaining power of enterprises can makes the peiyment 23. 59% lower than the benchmark labor remuneration, causing the workers to receive an actual labor remuneration 5. 90% lower than the benchmark of labor remuneration. Seen from the sample heterogeneity, the state-owned enterprises and their employees have the weakest bargaining power;the foreign enterprises and their employees have the strongest bargaining power, and the foreign capital enterprises ge