天津大学PPT模板讲课教案.pptVIP

1. Introduction 2. Literature Review 3. Model 3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game 4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information 5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory 5.1 Resource-Based Contract 5.2 Performance-Based Contract 6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory 6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract 7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies 7.1 Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers 8. Conclusions 1. Introduction 供货商 买方 产品 PBC RBC 可靠性 私有信息 使用 备用库存 维护 背景介绍 文献回顾 2. Literature Review PBC for outsourced services asymmetric information in operations management the use of warranties as a signaling mechanism 建模 3. Model 3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy N: identical copies; B: inventory backorder; s: inventory; The expected backorders in steady state is Availability is equal to 建模 3.2 Cost Structure Each time a product failure occurs, the buyer incurs a fixed cost r ≥ 0. The buyer’s expected cost is equal to The vendor’s expected cost is equal to 建模 3.3 Information Structure We assume that the product offered by the vendor is one of two possible types, L or H, where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability. Hazard rate ordering（危险率序）: Excess wealth ordering（剩余财富序）: 建模 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs We can write the buyer’s expected payoff as The vendor’s expected payoff is given by RBC: PBC: 建模 3.5 Signaling Game We assume that the vendor, who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product, chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer. The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at θ. We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is also renegotiation-proof. 建模 4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Com