博弈论复旦大学 王永钦复旦大学研究生一年级博弈论课程讲义.pptVIP

Cont d ? Definition3 : Given the discounted factor , the average payoff of the infinite sequence of payoffs is ? 1 2 3 , , ,... ? ? ? 1 1 (1 ) t t t ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Cont d The Folk Theorm : For every feasible payoff vector v with i i v v ? for all players i , there exists a 1 ? ? such that for all ( ,1) ? ? ? there exist a Nash Equilibrium with payoff v . (See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a rigorous proof.) Social Norms versus Laws (Kaushik Basu, 2001): The Core Theorem Implications of Repeated Games ? Reputation-building ? Collusion ? Social mobility and social capital ? Organization theory (Kreps) ? Exit and Voice 2.4 Dynamic Games with Complete but Imperfect Information ? At least some information set is not a singleton ? Sub-game Perfection Static (or Simultaneous-Move) Games of Incomplete Information Introduction to Static Bayesian Games Static (or simultaneous-move) games of complete information ? A set of players (at least two players) ? For each player , a set of strategies/actions ? Payoffs received by each player for the combinations of the strategies, or for each player , preferences over the combinations of the strategies ? All these are common knowledge among all the players. Static (or simultaneous-move) games of INCOMPLETE information ? Payoffs are no longer common knowledge ? Incomplete information means that ? At least one player is uncertain about some other player s payoff function. ? Static games of incomplete information are also called static Bayesian games Cournot duopoly model of complete information ? The normal-form representation: ? Set of players: { Firm 1, Firm 2} ? Sets of strategies: S 1 = [0, +∞), S 2 = [0, +∞) ? Payoff functions: u 1 ( q 1 , q 2 )= q 1 ( a- ( q 1 +q 2 )- c ), u 2 ( q 1 , q 2 )= q 2 ( a- ( q 1 +q 2 )- c ) ? All these information is common knowledge Cont d ? A homogeneous product is produced by only two firms: firm 1 and firm 2. The