财务治理下管理层股权激励效应初探.docVIP

财务治理下管理层股权激励效应初探 摘要 在公司制架构下，所有权与控制权的分离，产生了多重的“委托——代理”关系，从而影响到企业各种资源配置的效率。为了提高资源配置效率，降低交易费用，公司财务治理理论也随之提出。本文着重探讨的是财务治理视角下对管理层股权激励的效应。Berle 和 Means 曾假设：在无持有相当股权的情况下，公司的管理层将偏离公司价值最大化这一目标。而高管人员具有独特性、稀有性和难以模仿性，是形成企业价值的根本源泉，因此在一定程度上实现经营着目标和企业目标的融合，对管理层进行有效的激励是必须的。而股权激励机制就是解决这一问题的重要途径。完善的股权激励机制是实现有效财务治理的前提，只有来自市场、公司权利制衡和业绩评价的经营者约束与激励机制协同运作，经营者的道德风险和逆向选择才能得以有效控制。 【关键词】委托——代理 财务治理 股权激励 Abstract Under the company’s system architecture, the separation of ownership and control, resulting in multiple “Principal--Agent” relationship, which affects the efficiency of enterprises of various resource allocation. In order to improve the efficiency of resource allocation, reduce transaction costs, Company’s Financial Governance Theory also puts forward. This article focuses on the effects of financial governance perspective on the management equity incentive.Berle and Means once assumed that: the company’s management will deviate from the company maximize the value of this goal, if there is no significant equity in hand. And the fundamental source of enterprise value based on executives’ uniqueness, rarity and imitability. So it is effective incentive for management to achieve operating goals and business objectives of integration. However, equity incentive mechanism is an important way to solve this problem. Only the operators of constraint checks and balances from the markets, the company’s right and performance evaluation and incentive mechanism work together operators of moral hazard and adverse selection in order to be effectively controlled, the perfect equity incentive mechanism is the premise of effective financial governance. Key words: principal-agent Financial management equity incentive mechanism 目录 0、引言 1 1.股权激励相关理论 1 1.1委托代理理论 1 1.2人力资本理论 2 2.中国股权激励现状 4 2.1股权激励类型 4 2.2我国上市公司股权激励制度的相关设定 5 2.3我国股权激励实施背景分析 6 3.管理层股权激励对公司影响分析 7 3.1 股权激励可以加速公司成长 7 3.2股权激励有利于吸引、留住人才 7 3.3股权激励有利于解决财务治理中存在的矛盾 8 3.4股权激励有助于提高公司绩效 8 4.实例分析——以银江股份有限公司为例 9 4.1公司背景 9 4.2公司经营情况 9 4.3股权激励实施背景 9