财务报表舞弊:从学术的角度分析外文翻译.doc

财务报表舞弊:从学术的角度分析外文翻译.doc

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外文文献翻译 原文: Financial Statement Fraud: Insights from the Academic Literature Factors Affecting Financial Fraud At An Organization Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, states that three conditions are generally present when fraud occurs. First, there is an incentive or a pressure to commit fraud. Second, circumstances provide an opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated weak controls or ability of management to override controls. Finally, there is an attitude or rationalization for committing fraud. These conditions collectively are known as the fraud triangle. We reviewed the academic ?ndings related to the presence of these conditions in cases of ?nancial statement fraud. This helps provide a basis for understanding the development of the questionnaires and checklists in SAS No. 82 and SAS No. 99. The following is a detailed description of these three elements: Incentives/Pressures The incentive to misstate earnings can arise due to pressure to meet analysts’ forecasts, compensation and incentive structures, the need for external ?nancing, or poor performance. Dechow et al. (1996), using a sample of 92 ?rms subject to accounting enforcement releases during the period 1982–1992, ?nd that an important motivation to manipulate earnings is the desire to attract external ?nancing at low cost. .Erickson et al.(2006) investigate whether executive equity incentives are associated with accounting fraud. They examine a sample of ?rms accused of fraud during the 1996–2003 period and do not ?nd any relation between equity incentives and the likelihood of the ?rm reporting fraudulent ?nancial information.. In contrast, Efendi et al. (2007),using a sample of ?rms that restated their ?nancial statements, ?nd the likelihood of a misstated ?nancial statement increases when the CEO has a sizable amount of stock options “in-the-money.” They also ?nd that misstatements are more likely for ?rms constraine

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