中国基本养老保险制度模式对退休行为影响研究.pdfVIP

中国基本养老保险的制度模式对退休行为的影响研究 —兼论其对弹性退休制的启示 Mechanism of the Impact of Chinas basic old-age insurance system mode on retirement behavior - And Its Inspiration for the flexible retirement system 【摘要】是否延长及如何延长法定退休年龄一直是政策制定者及社会各 界关注的焦点话题。本文根据2000-2012年广东省A市城镇职工基本养老保险缴费 与待遇的个人微观数据，利用2005年基本养老保险制度改革提供的外生性政策实 验机会，实证检验了不同制度背景下养老金财富激励对职工退休行为的影响。结 果表明：(1）2005年改革前我国养老保险制度对个人延长退休行为存在普遍的负 向激励 （即会增加提 退休行为出现的概率）；(2）部分积累模式中积累部分比 重的提高转变了财富激励对个人退休行为的作用方向：2005年改革后，尽管仍然 存在负向激励，然而受人力资本以及收入水平约束，低收入人群反而更倾向于延 迟退休，而拥有较高收入的人群倾向于正常退休；(3）2005年改革后低收入女性 延迟退休的意愿比男性更强。基于以上结论，作者认为，弹性退休制政策的制定 方向应 在延续现行部分积累养老保险制度模式基础上，改变政策参数以激励个 人延迟退休；建议政府实行弹性退休制时周全考虑，在尽量减弱或消除负向激励 作用的同时，对不同收入、性别的群体采取不同的调整方式及补贴机制；同时， 还需要完善基本养老金投资机制，使其与弹性退休政策相配套。 Abstract whether to extend and how to extend the statutory retirement age has been a topic of focus for policy makers and the public. From the perspective of the relationship of the basic pension wealth incentives and retirement behavior, Using the micro data of Guangzhou s urban basic pension insurance information on the time span from 2000 to 2012, as well as the exogenous policy experiments opportunities provided by the basic old-age insurance system reform in 2005, We empirically test the effect of pension incentives on the retirement behavior under different pension institutions. The results showed that: ( 1) there exists negative incentives under the pre-reform old-age insurance system (ie, it will reduce the probability of occurrence of delayed retirement behavior); (2) the enhancements of part accumulated old-age insurance system has changed the direction of the effects of incentive on the retirement behavior : after the reform, although there still exists negative incentive, under the human capital and income level constraints, low-income people would be more inclined to delay retirement, while higher income groups tend to normal or early retirement; (3) after the reform , the