产权软约束、官商合谋与寻租性腐败.docVIP

中国经济学年会投稿 研究领域：制度经济学 产权软约束、官商合谋与寻租性腐败 ——国有企业产权改革过程中的腐败机理分析 江曙霞 罗 杰 黄君慈 厦门大学经济学院金融系 福建 厦门 361005 摘要：本文通过对国有产权改革寻租性流失进行深入的剖析，从而揭示在我国转轨经济过程中，当进入以产权改革为主导的改革路径时，必然导致权人利益集团和寻租集团进行产权寻租合作博弈，对高度集中和产权软约束的国有产权进行重新分配，并通过产权交易寻租性市场出清，达到权人利益集团的利益补偿和寻租利益集团的产权瓜分，形成制度性的产权寻租性腐败。 关键词：产权软约束 官商合谋 寻租性腐败 国有产权改革 Soft Constraint of Property Rights、Collusion of Official with Businessman and Rent-Seeking Corruption——Study on the Corruption Mechanism in the Process of the State-Owned Property Rights’ Reform Xiamen University Department of Finance, Fujian Xiamen 361005 ShuXia, Jiang LuoJie JunCi,Huang Abstract: Through analyzing the loss of the state-owned assets in the process of the state-owned property rights’ reform, the paper illuminates the institutional-related rent-seeking corruption by cooperative game between the power interest group and rent-seeking interest group in Chinese transition economy. While the reform enters into the phase in which the property right’s reform is predominant, the power interest group and the rent-seeking interest group will redistribute the state-owned property rights that has characteristics of height concentration and soft constraint, and through rent-seeking market clearing to acquire the interest compensation of the power interest group and the partition to state-owned property rights of the renting interest group. Then it comes into being institutional rent-seeking corruption mechanism in the state-owned property rights’ reform. Keywords: Soft Constraint of Property Rights Collusion of Official with Businessman Rent-Seeking Corruption Reform of State-Owned Property Rights 一、引 言 郎顾之争诱发了我国关于国有企业产权改革的大讨论，尽管关于国有产权改革经济学家们有不同的理论视角和政策主张，但是关于国有资产流失的社会认同已是不争的事实。我国公有产权和渐进性的改革路径使得大量的制度租金沉淀在各个领域，由于垄断使得租金无法通过市场化手段得到有效耗散，寻租成为各利益集团的比较优势。随着改革的推进和市场深化，巨额租金从商品市场向生产要素市场即从价格双轨制向具有“公地悲剧”性质的国有产权改革转移，与之相对应的寻租性腐败也呈现出阶段性特征：第一个阶段是20世纪80年代中后期，由于我国价格双轨制（主要是商品、生产资料及金融领域的价格）形成的腐败；第二个阶段是始于20世纪90年代后期，特别是近些年我国国有企业产权改革由于产权软约束所形成的寻租性腐败。 本文通过对国有资产产权改革寻租性流失进