精粹模式、高管薪酬设计和风险配置激励--来自金融行业高管薪酬激励机制证据.pdfVIP

精粹模式、高管薪酬设计和风险配置激励 ——来自金融行业高管薪酬激励机制的证据 李文峰 作者：李文峰 单位：西南财经大学中国金融研究中心 联系地址：成都市温江区柳台大道 555 号 西南财经大学柳林校区博学院 C 座 邮编：611130 Tel E-mail ：jungbrunnen@yahoo.cn 摘要：在金融行业内公司高管风险态度中性条件下，当前我国金融行业中现金薪酬和潜在权 益薪酬对 CEO的风险选择和配置具有显著的约束效应，尤其是通过约束 CEO增加可以用市场 交易来掩盖的系统风险的行为而降低公司总风险。但整体上潜在权益激励对 CEO风险选择约 束幅度低于现金薪酬的约束幅度。以“精粹模式”为代表的社会体制因素对 CEO风险及其组 合的选择配置直接激励约束效应相当小，主要体现在约束 CEO增加公司非系统风险的行为方 面，但是其通过对薪酬结构的影响而最终作用于 CEO风险选择的间接效应较为显著。 关键词 精粹模式 高管薪酬 风险配置 金融行业 Abstract ：With the condition of financial industry executives risk attitude neutral, Cash compensation and potential stock options has significant effect of constraint to the CEOs risk selection and configuration in Chinas financial industry. Especially it reduces the risk of the companys total risk that in the way of constraining the CEO’s behavior of increasing market transactions which are used to cover up the systems risk. However, overall the amplitude for the constraints of risk which potential equity incentive of CEO’s choose is lower than the constraints what cash compensation produce. The social system which is represented by “extractive institutions” mode produce directly incentive constraint effect to the choice and configuration for combination of CEO risk is fairly small, mainly it is reflected in the way that constraint CEO increase company idiosyncratic risk behavior. But it is comparatively significant on the ultimate CEO indirect risk selection effect by its the impact on the compensation structure. Keywords Extractive Institutions Executive Compensation Risk Disposition Financial Industry 一、引言 源于次贷危机的发达国家金融市场崩溃所引致的金融危机为理论界留下了 诸多研究视角。截止到目前，有关本次金融危机形成根源、发展机理及造成的影 响等问题的研究成果层出不穷，其研究结论、观点及对应措施也不尽相同，但存 在着两方面的基本共识：其一，金融危机所形成的风险对现代经济体