Security in Wireless Sensor Networks.ppt

ASIACCS 2010 ASIACCS 2010 ASIACCS 2010 ASIACCS 2010 ASIACCS 2010 ASIACCS 2010 ASIACCS 2010 Security in Wireless Sensor Networks Tuan Vu, Rei Safavi-Naini, and Carey Williamson Department of Computer Science University of Calgary Wireless communication can be intercepted A wireless sensor network (WSN) Nodes can be captured Wireless Sensor Network Security A typical sensor A bad guy (an adversary) * ASIACCS 2010 The WSN Security Dilemma Operate WSN without encryption? No. Central key distribution center? No. Key installation after deployment? No. Pre-configure a single global key? No. Pre-configure pairwise unique keys? No. Random key pre-distribution? Yes! * ASIACCS 2010 Random Key Pre-distribution [Eschenauer and Gligor 2002] Eschenauer and Gligor (EG) pioneered a random key pre-distribution approach: Key pool size: N Key ring size: m Network size: n A C E B D Wireless connectivity B C D E A {3, 4} N = 5, m=2, key pool: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} {1, 2} {4, 5} {2, 4} {3, 5} An example of a WSN with 5 nodes (n = 5) Secure connectivity achieved by the EG scheme. Eschenauer and Gligor use Erdos-Renyi’s random graph theory to model the secure connectivity * ASIACCS 2010 q-composite and multi-path key reinforcement are two notable solutions to strengthen the EG scheme [Chan et al. 2003] Malicious adversary - The adversary can capture nodes and obtain pre-loaded keys. Node: A Keys: 3, 4 - Links connected to captured nodes are compromised. Links: AC, AD - Links between uncaptured nodes may be compromised as well. , CD Captured nodes behave the same as others so that the adversary will remain undetected while attacking the network. q-composite scheme: two wireless neighbors must have at least q keys in common to set up a secure link. Multi-path key reinforcement (mkr) technique: once all nodes have established secure connectivity (e.g., with the EG scheme), two nodes can negotiate a new key by exchanging S random strings through S disjoint paths between them. The EG scheme a