国有企业薪酬激励机制与研究.docVIP

国有企业薪酬激励机制研究 ? 摘要：随着市场经济的发展，企业家的价值日益凸显。本文以国有企业薪酬激励问题为切入点，以国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制为研究对象，对国有企业薪酬激励机制现状进行了分析。通过有关薪酬激励概念机制相关论述的总结和分析，探讨了国有企业经营者薪酬的内涵，并对影响经营者的薪酬的因素进行了分析。在回顾国外企业经营者薪酬机制的基础上，本文总结了国企经营者薪酬激励机制的缺陷，通过对年薪制和股权制的案例分析，将两者进行了比较分析。本文提出在操作实践中，现阶段国有企业经营者收入分配制度改革应以年薪制为主体，多种激励方式并举的结论，并提出了完善此结论的相关建议。 ? ? Abstract ：With the development of market economy, the value of entrepreneurs has become increasingly prominent. In this paper, the problem of state-owned enterprises pay incentives is the entry point, and state-owned business operator salary incentive mechanism is the object of study; Then, this paper analyzed the situation of state-owned enterprises pay incentive mechanism, discussed the connotation of the state-owned enterprise operator’s pay through the summary of pay incentive mechanism’s concept, and the impact factors of the operators pay. This paper summarized the defects of the state-owned enterprises operators pay incentive mechanism on the basis of the summary of foreign operators pay mechanism. Through the case of annual salary system and Equity incentive, this paper compared the differentiation of the two incentive mechanism. At last, this paper made conclusions, which thought the reform of state-owned enterprises operating income distribution system should be based on annual salary system as the main way combining a variety of incentives in practice, and gave same relevant recommendations. ? ? Key words: Salary; State-owned Enterprise; Operator; Incentive Mechanism  ? ? ? 一. 绪论 1.1 研究背景及目的 改革开放以来，国企改革的基本思路在实质上一直是在如何建立有效的激励机制上做文章，无论是以政企分开为导向的承包制，还是以高层激励为主的年薪制和经营者持股制，都是这一思路的体现。但迄今为止，我国国企中，尚未建立良性运转的有效激励约束制度，导致国有企业委托代理关系内在动力机制失灵。在这种情况下，委托代理关系是否有效，取决于代理人本身道德觉悟的高低。而事实上，代理人首先是有限理性的经济人，很难做到“义在利先”，因而国有企业大量存在着“保持中游现象”、“59岁现象”、“穷庙富方丈”等不正常现象。另外，激励和约束机制的失灵，也导致了“在职消费”、“隐性收入”等畸形激励的发展。近几年来，一部分国有企业进行股份制改革，并建立了一套自己的经营者激励制度，如年薪制、经营者持股制等，但没有收到应有的效果。 薪酬问题是现代企业管理理论研究的一个核心问题，也是一个比较难解决的问题。如何构建有效的国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制，一直是我国国企改革和发展中亟需解决的问题。正如曾先后任中国石油化工集团公司总经理和中国石化股份有限公司董事长的原国资委党委书记、副主任李毅中所指出的：一