比较商事组织法(2009级法学硕士).pptVIP

Laws on Business Organizations: A Comparative Study Dr. Prof. Ding DING School of Law University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) ding0118@ Bibliography Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law[公司法基础(影印本)], 法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版. Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation[林华伟 等译],法律出版社, 北京,2001年4月第一版. 《公司法剖析：比较与功能的视角》（公司法与公司治理译丛），北京大学出版社，2007年版。 A research paper on any Corporate Law issues Contents ·Theory of the Firm and Capital Market · Legal Characteristics of the Corporation: Limited Liability · The Production and Structure of Corporation Laws · Financing the Corporation · Internal Governance Structures · External Governance Structures: The Market for Corporate Control · Securities Regulation What I Expect from you…? Class presentation and discussion Off-class Preview and Review Open-minded… 课程说明 ※全部上课时间为17周,按每个部分三周的时间预习ROMANO的FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW的内容. ※第一部分上课讨论的重点是JENSEN,WILLIAMSON和HANSMANN三位学者的代理成本的理论发展.请看本书之序言部分(方流芳教授著). ※课堂问题会有变化,会随课堂互动变化. Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets 为什么有企业/厂商?[交易\市场和企业/厂商] 它们在资本市场的地位和作用 Other Notes and Questions on pp.22-25. Further Questions… What features a public corporation? What is the key problem of the modern corporation identified by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means? [The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: MacMillan, 1932] Even Further… Agency Costs? [Jensen and Meckling] Is it possible to decrease, or even to delete them? How would you comment on the market for corporate control and agency costs? [Oliver Williamson] Is a corporation an alternative to the market? Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (3) 经理和股东存在利益冲突,代理成本不可能为零;所有者是代理成本的最终承担者,增加代理成本则可以使经理单方面受益,这里就出现了需要法律敢于的现象----成本转嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干预的目标----减少代理成本.因此,检验公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否减少了代理成本. 方流芳:序言,第3页.[Jensen Meckling] ！结合我国公司法,你如何理解我国法律是否减少了代理成本,请举例说明. Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (4) 企业正是针对机会主义\交易成本和合同不完备的回应(p.10).当合同一方是 “交易专用财产”(trade-specific assets)的所有者时,交易双方组建企业比签定合同更有效率