高管激励及企业业绩的U形关系—基于边际递减效应和过度激励研究.pdfVIP

高管激励与企业业绩的U 形关系 ——基于边际递减效应和过度激励的研究 摘 要：在“第二类代理问题” 占据主导和隐性激励大量存在的中国市场，上市公司高管看起来 显著较低的薪酬和持股比例亦可能导致较为严重的过度激励。有鉴于此，本文首先基于边际递 减效应构建理论模型分析高管激励与企业业绩之间的作用逻辑，而后选择2001-2006 年中国上 市公司的经验证据，具体讨论高管薪酬和股权激励对企业业绩的影响。有别于先前多数有关高 管激励的研究文献，本文不仅清晰展现了高管薪酬和股权激励存在的滞后效应；而且进一步在 理论分析和实证研究中发现并证实高管薪酬和股权激励存在显著的边际递减效应和过度激励， 即高管薪酬激励和股权激励与企业业绩之间在表现为线性正相关关系的同时呈现出左低右高 的倒“U”形关系，薪酬和持股比例过低不利于激发高管努力工作改善企业业绩，但薪酬和持股 比例过高亦可能导致高管过度激励，同样会对企业业绩造成损害。 关键词：高管激励 边际递减效应 过度激励 薪酬激励 股权激励 隐性激励 The U-shape Relationship between Top Management Incentive and Corporate Performance: Research based on Marginal Diminishing Effect and Excessive Incentive Abstract: In Chinese market with dominance of “the Second Agency Problem” and large existence of implicit incentive, apparently few compensation and shareholdings of top management may still lead to severe excessive incentive. Firstly, the paper, based on marginal diminishing effect, constructs a theoretical model to analyze the relationship between top management incentive and corporate performance, then with evidences from Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2006, discusses the impacts of compensation incentive and ownership incentive for top management on corporate performance. Different from most of other former researches, the paper not only clearly shows delayed effect of compensation incentive and ownership incentive for top management, but also finds significant marginal diminishing effect and excessive incentive of compensation incentive and ownership incentive for top management in theoretical and empirical analyses which results in an inverted U-shape relationship with a lower left wing and higher right wing between compensation incentive and ownership incentive for top management and corporate performance. That is to say, not only insufficient incentive because of too low top management compensation and share